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In January 1824, a twenty-two-year-old Ralph Waldo Emerson wasbeginning to despair of discovering genuine creativity in his own time:“Men in this age”, he writes in his journal, “do not produce new works
but admire old ones; are content to leave the fresh pastures awhile, & to
chew the cud of thought in the shade” (Journals 2 208). The extended
bovine metaphor long predates the famous opening lines of his 1836
Nature: “Our age is retrospective. It builds on the sepulchres of the fathers”
(Works 1 7). In 1824, the potential artists of Emerson’s age are the cheerful
“cud” chewers merely mouthing the regurgitated sustenance of an earlier
time. As they ruminate “in the shade”, their “thought” is one step further
removed from an original source and, consequently, they themselves are
unoriginal. The theme quietly announced here is that some kind of
intimate relationship with nature’s “fresh pastures” is required for artistic
inspiration. This can be related to Emerson’s contemporaneous “theory of
strong impulse”, an impulse that came to America with the Puritan fathers,
who “had done their done their duty to literature whey they bequeathed
it the Paradise Lost and Comus” (Journals 2: 197). But what was strong
in England, Emerson laments, has in the New World “been dissipated by
the unfortunate rage for periodical productions” (197). And rather than
building on the Puritan legacy American letters in 1824 are held back by
“[t]he community of language with England [that] has doubtless deprived
us of that original characteristic literary growth that has ever accompanied,
I apprehend [,] the first bursting of a nation from the bud” (197). To return
to the opening metaphor of the ruminant in the shade, the fresh nibbled
pastures were English pastures — the shady trees of the cud chewers are
American. There is a transatlantic originality which has been has yet to be
reborn on, or from, American soil. To discover a “strong impulse” for New
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England, to find a language that lives within the English inheritance and
that can represent America, will be Emerson’s great achievement and the
beginning of what has come to be called the American Renaissance.1
Just a few months after the young Emerson had been despondent
about the possibility of originality, he believed he had come up against the
very limits of thought: “Metaphysicians are mortified”, he writes, “to find
how entirely the whole materials of understanding are derived from sense”
(Journals 2 224). The conclusion Emerson drew from this epistemological
mortification was to “fear the progress of Metaphys[ical] philosophy may
be found to consist in nothing else than the progressive introduction of
apposite metaphors” (224). His examples are Plato’s “dark chamber” 
and John Locke’s “sheet of white paper” (225), both objects of sense that
come to stand for knowledge of the mind. Emerson is here working
through a paradox in the Empiricist education that had made up the spine
of his Harvard curriculum (Todd 64). In An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690/1694), the bedrock of empiricism, Locke had
written that “all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence
hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the
passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect
cheat” (452). In his search for clear and distinct ideas, and in line with a
tradition in English philosophy that has been traced to Bacon and Hobbes
(Forrester 612-616), Locke had dismissed metaphor from any discourse
that was to “inform or instruct” or which would make any claim to “truth
and knowledge” (Locke 452). But, at the same time, and this is the paradox
that Emerson notices, arguably his most influential ideas were expressed
through metaphors, one of the most prominent among them being the
“white paper” (88), which was used as part of Locke’s argument against
the principle of innate ideas and to which Emerson alludes in his journal.
This is, of course, precisely Emerson’s concern. Metaphors, on these terms,
appear to reveal philosophical aporia: those moments when the mind, at
its fullest extent, requires the support of “apposite metaphors” derived from
sense rather than sustaining itself on clear and distinct ideas (see Vogt 1-4;
Clark 242-245). Just what happens when Emerson’s fears about the
   1 See my “Atlantic Adam”.
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possibility of American literary originality and the metaphorical limitations
of the progress of metaphysical philosophy become the enabling vectors
not only for an understanding of the mind but also for American literature
itself is what I want to outline in this essay. In brief, I argue that Emerson
recognises metaphor as a liberating principle for original expression, and I
use I. A. Richards’ concept of “ground” from his 1936 theory of metaphor
to explore in detail Emerson’s purposive engagement with figurative
language. What this leads to is a fresh interpretation of Emerson’s concept
of “symbolism” that is outlined in his 1844 essay “The Poet”, one of the
grounding statements of American literary originality.
It was when Emerson began to think about artistic creation, and
literature in particular, in the mid-1830s that he re-evaluated the role of
the English language, of metaphor and of the place of sensation in writing.
He first outlines the possibilities of metaphor — in ways that will become
the backbone of the 1836 Nature’s theory of language — in his “Intro -
ductory” lecture to an upcoming series on English Literature in November
of 1835. Here, ten years after his initial doubts, the objects that sensation
finds are no longer framed as limits to knowledge. In a radical change of
perspective that leaves things just as they were but transforms how they are
understood, metaphors have become the very means of knowledge’s creative
expression by “man”. As he writes: “objects without him are more than
commodities. Whilst they minister to the senses sensual gratification, they
minister to the mind as vehicles and symbols of thought. All language is
the naming of invisible and spiritual things from visible things. The use of
the outer creation is to give us language for the beings and changes of inward
creation” (Early Lectures 1 220). Sensations, then, give us objects; but
more than that they give us our only access to inner life as “inward creation”,
not limitation. They have become the “vehicles and symbols of thought”. 
That Emerson is referring here to metaphor is clarified in the next
few lines:
Every word which is used to express a moral or intellectual
fact, if traced to its root, is found to be borrowed from some
corporeal or animal fact. Right originally means straight; wrong
means twisted. Spirit primarily means wind. Transgression
means the crossing a line. Supercilious, the raising of the
eyebrow. Light and heat in all languages are used as metaphors
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of wisdom and love. We say heart to express emotion; the
head to denote thought: and “thought” and “emotion” are in
their turn mere words borrowed from sense, that have become
appropriated to spiritual nature. (220)
Here, in Emerson’s developing theory of language, metaphor, far from
being a limit to an understanding of the mind, is what allows us to
understand it at all. To grasp how this works in the lecture and in his essay
Nature, published the following year, and where this passage is employed
almost without variation (Works 1 18), it is useful to draw on the model
of metaphor that I. A. Richards outlined in his Philosophy of Rhetoric
(1936). There Richards makes the distinction between the tenor, the
vehicle and the ground of a metaphor (96-97, 117). The tenor is the
subject of the metaphor, which in the first instance above is the “moral or
intellectual fact”; the vehicle the term used, that is, the “corporeal or animal
fact”, and the ground the thing they have in common that allows the one
to express the other. So, in Emerson’s first example, “right”, as a certain
kind of behaviour is the tenor; the word right’s original meaning (i.e.,
straight) is the vehicle. Just what the ground is, though, becomes an
important question. Is it directness (moving right towards something — if
so what?), squareness, rectitude (having a balanced form), being upright?
Whichever line we follow appears to lead only to another metaphor. In the
second instance, “wrong” is the vehicle, wrong’s original meaning (twisted)
is the tenor, and the ground is indirectness, warpedness, perversity —
namely another series of other metaphors. The implication of Emerson’s
argument is that the very ideas of right and wrong are only able to be
expressed because ways of thinking and objects of sense share certain
characteristics — can be straight or twisted. This “sharedness” is what
Richards refers to as the ground. This is not to make a stronger claim that
language pre-exists thought, but only to say that, for Emerson, thought
can only be expressed metaphorically — at least, in the first instance.
Objects in the world are the “vehicles” of thought, and the tenor, which is
thinking itself, can come to language on the sole condition that a vehicle
with the right ground can be found. 
If we go back to the metaphor of the ruminant American writers in
the shade of the tree, then it can be interpreted as follows: the cud upon
which they chew is formed of the dead metaphors bequeathed by the
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vitality of earlier transatlantic generations, for “[i]n the writers in the
morning of each nation such as Homer, Froissart, and Chaucer every word
is a picture” (Lectures 1 222). America, even in the very fullness of its own
morning, had proven quite unable to express itself in this metaphorical
way, and a national literature has failed to come into being. The aim of
Emerson’s lectures, as they move through the great poets of the English
renaissance from Chaucer to Milton, is to attempt to understand how this
was achieved in England. First he outlines what he calls “the power of the
poet” in what should be now familiar terms:
The power of the Poet depends on the fact that the material
world is a symbol or expression of the human mind and part
for part. Every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact.
Light and darkness are our familiar expression for knowledge
and ignorance and heat for love. Who looks upon a river in a
meditative hour and is not reminded of the flux of all things?
Throw a stone into the stream and the circles that propagate
themselves are the beautiful type of all influence. (289)
Again, the otherwise unavailable tenors of inner life, its feelings, which are
seeking expression, come to language only through the various grounds of
objects of sensation: light (which grounded wisdom earlier and now
grounds knowledge), dark, heat, a river, a spreading circle. The poet’s job,
according to Emerson, is little more than this metaphorical conversion of
spirit into matter through the discovery of grounds: “He converts the solid
globe, the land, the sea, the air, the sun, into symbols of thought. He makes
the outward creation subordinate and merely a convenient alphabet to
express thoughts and emotions” (291). Thereby the poet gives us the
lexicon for the human mind built up out of the resources of nature and
thus to define (and, ultimately, redefine) what it is to be human.
Nevertheless, this resource, though available to all, is not availed of
— and is certainly not availed of in Emerson’s New England. Rather it is
“the habit of men (… ) to rest in the objects immediately around them, to
go along with the tide, and take their impulse from external things” (226).
This may at first glance appear inconsistent (which would hardly be un-
Emersonian), because taking an impulse from external things is precisely
what the poet is supposed to do; but the idea is that the external world,
nature, should be subordinate to the poet; not that the poet should be
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subordinate to it. In the English tradition Shakespeare is exemplary:
“Shakespeare possesses the power of subordinating nature for the purposes
of expression beyond all poets. His imperial muse tosses the creation like
a bauble from hand to hand to embody any capricious shade of thought
that is uppermost in his mind” (293). Shakespeare’s gift is exemplary; he
is the model poet who opens language and thus unfixes thought, a process
which in itself is only enabled by the construction of new metaphors —
the opening of grounds. Throughout Emerson’s career Shakespeare is the
foremost example of the “liberating Gods” of the later essay “The Poet”,
to which I shall return below.
What Shakespeare and all great poets liberate us from is “custom”;
the enemy in many of Emerson’s major works, including Nature, “The
American Scholar”, “The Divinity School Address”, “Self-Reliance”, and
“Circles”. “Custom”, Emerson writes, “is the defacer of beauty, and the
concealer of truth. Custom represents every thing as immovably fixed. But
the first effort of thought is to lift things from their feet and make all
objects of sense appear fluent. Even a small alteration in our position breaks
the spell and removes the curtain of Custom” (Lectures 1 226). If we find
ourselves — and for Emerson we nearly always do — caught up in the
narrow circuit of custom, the world appears to have already been successfully
fixed into position and thus seems immovable. It is thought that allows for
a reordering and a glimpse of beauty and truth. But new thought, as has
already been noted, requires a new and vital language; or, rather, and this
is important, an old language that can be used in a new way. The world
demands a fresh metaphorical inscription to be seen in its right light. In
this poetic act both the world and man are liberated from custom. In the
early lectures he phrases it as follows: “To break the chains of custom, to
see everything as it absolutely exists, and so to clothe everything ordinary
and even sordid with beauty is the aim of the Thinker” (228). The poet’s
task is to clothe all subjects — no matter how quotidian and no matter how
sordid (a line put in to excuse both Chaucer and Shakespeare) — with beauty. 
What appears at first inappropriate about this particular metaphor
of “clothing” is that rather than covering something it actually reveals 
an underlying truth; he has only just written, after all, that “custom (… )
is the concealer of truth”. But here it is as if the vestment of beauty is
transparent — like Eve seen by Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost: 
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Eve separate he spies
Veild in a Cloud of Fragrance, where she stood,
Half spied so thick the Roses bushing round
About her glowed (Book 9 424-427)
The transparency of Eve’s scent and the partially obscuring bushes only
add to her nakedness in the leering gaze of the Adversary. Satan’s fallen
eye is the eye of custom. But to the unfallen eye Eve’s insubstantial veil
reveals the innocence of her undimmed beauty. In these lines we have, as
so often in Paradise Lost, a double view: both fallen and unfallen. Within
the poem, beauty’s role is to create a site of struggle between fixed and free
behaviour — to create a sufficient condition for choice. Even Satan, dazzled
by Eve, “abstracted stood/ From his own evil, and for a time stood/ Stupidly
good” (Book 9 463-5). The first woman’s veil of fragrance, her raiment 
of beauty, acts to enhance the innocence of her underlying form, and 
what Satan sees in Eve, who “summs all Delight” (454), and albeit only
temporarily, is a respite from confusion; the deeper peace of a connection
that comes, to borrow Milton’s figures, with an escape from the “populous
City” to the pleasant “rural sight” and “rural sound” of an Edenic landscape
(445, 451). Satan has been liberated by beauty from his fixed pattern 
of behaviour; and in order to persist in evil he has to choose “the hot 
Hell that always in him burnes” (467); that is, he has to fall again. And
analogously, for Emerson, the clothing of beauty discloses a connection to
the whole that reorders our experience: “Every object in nature rightly seen
is related to the whole and partakes of the perfection of the whole; a leaf,
a sunbeam, a moment of time, and no sane man can wish to lose his
admiration” (Lectures 1 229). The reader, then, of the ideal poem is like
Satan struck stupid by Eve: his Fallen world view collapses in an epiphany
of beauty and, for a moment, like the unfallen angels, he stands, as Satan
‘stood”, rather than falls. It is the poet’s task to allow the reader access to
this “nature rightly seen” and thus to recover him from the Fall.2
   2 The idea here that beauty allows you to find yourself in harmony with nature is
analogous to some tentative research by Mark Johnson that aligns metaphor with
Kant’s concept of aesthetic judgement and the attunement of the free-play of the
imagination with the understanding (Johnson 57-62).
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But, and this is equally important, such prelapsarian visions must
be receivable by all men: “All men are capable of this act. The very utterance
of his thoughts to men, proves the poet’s faith, that, all men can receive
them; that all men are poets, though in a less degree” (228). The further
leap he makes is that all men are already poets “though in a less degree”,
because all language is, at root, poetical: “[a]s we go back in history, language
becomes more picturesque, until its infancy, when it is all poetry” (221).
Now this is building to another of Emerson’s most famous lines, “[l]anguage
is fossil poetry” (Works 3 13), but it begins with a less pithy reflection in
December of 1841:
As the limestone in our quarries is found to consist of infinite
masses of the remains of animicules, so language is made up
of images or poetic tropes which now in their familiar
secondary use have quite ceased to remind us of their poetic
origin, as howl from owl, ravenous from raven, rotation from
wheel, and so on to infinity. (Journals 8 160)
His point here is that men are all already poets; as he reminds us in “The
Poet”: “[t]he people fancy they hate poetry, and they are all poets and
mystics!” (Works 3 10) People, then, are already located in metaphors —
albeit mostly dead metaphors (the difference between the poet and the
mystic being that the latter, the mystics, are trapped in the narrow circuit
of the dead metaphor: original insight faded to custom). But the very fact
that language is metaphorical by nature has, for Emerson, the potential for
liberation; a new metaphor opens up a new relation: what is needed to
generate new metaphors is merely a new angle of vision, a new take on
nature itself. 
In order to attain this novelty, this liberty, it is not that we first need
to see something new in nature (say, America) and then name it with a
new word and thus crack custom (though this must have happened once
— but that would have been before there was such a thing as custom). It
is rather a process of discovering the vitality in our extant vocabulary that
creates the new angle of vision by opening new metaphoric grounds. He
tries to sketch the process of metaphorical re-inscription for the concept
of “nature” in the in a journal entry of 1841:
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The Metamorphosis of nature shows itself in nothing more
than this that there is no word in our language that cannot
become typical to us of nature by giving it emphasis. The
world is a Dancer; it is a Rosary; it is a Torrent; it is a Boat; a
Mist; a Spider’s Snare; it is what you will; and the metaphor
will hold, & it will give the imagination keen pleasure. Swifter
than light the World converts itself into that thing you name
& all things find their right place under the new & capricious
classification. (Journals 7 23) 
What is apparent here is that the change in the concept of “nature” is
caused by a change in the commanding metaphor, not by some neologism,
a scientific or geographic discovery or a philosophical vision. To return to
Richards’s formulation, when the vehicle changes the ground shifts, and
the tenor (here the world) is reinvented accordingly. So, if the metaphor 
is the “world is a Dancer”, then the tenor, “world”, takes on the ground 
of the vehicle, the dancer. This ground is an open one — and that, I think,
is key — for “dancing” means something different to every reader and 
in every time of its utterance, and thus the world itself is as open as the
word’s usable connotations. Even if the word Dancer is likely to have a
core meaning of, say, a tension between rhythmic beauty and liberation;
intimacy and formality, individuality and partnership, this will not exhaust
the word’s potential and thus its power to re-angle vision. If the vehicle
shifts to a Rosary, then a whole new ground is opened and the Puritan and
the Catholic will come to very different conclusions about the tenor. Any
metaphor applied in this way — assuming that it has the energy of novelty
— will metamorphose nature. This process is, as Emerson notes, capricious.
But even so things find their right place within the classification. Language
does not collapse at this proliferation because, in Emerson’s theory, it is
designed for it. Moreover, and as should be apparent from the range of the
metaphors chosen by Emerson, this is necessarily an endless process. Each
of his metaphors is either natural (torrent, mist, spider’s snare) or found
in nature in its widest sense (dancer, rosary, boat). It is when the whole
(that is, nature) is conceived anew through any one of its particulars —
which are all but numberless — that this metaphorical metamorphosis
takes place. The shifting of vision which Emerson calls for is always already
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there in the language — all that is needed is someone to point it out
through an “apposite metaphor”.
But, as already observed, more usually people speak according to
custom, according to the fixed dictates of dead metaphor — they are cud
chewers rather than grazers, mystics rather than poets. As such, the power
to create tends to lay dormant, waiting in the language for the right speaker.
Waiting, that is, for the Poet to make the crucial connection between part
and whole that will reawaken language. He develops this, albeit not very
clearly, in a journal entry in 1841:
As to the Miracle of Poetry. There is but one miracle, the
perpetual fact of Being & Becoming, the ceaseless Saliency,
the transit from the Vast to the particular, which miracle, one
& the same, has for its most universal name, the word God.
Take one or two or three steps where you will, from any fact
in nature or art, & you come out full on this fact; as you may
penetrate the forest in any direction & go straight on, you
will come to the sea. But all the particulars of the poet’s merit,
his sweetest rhythms, the subtlest thoughts, the richest images,
if you could pass into his consciousness, or rather, if you could
exalt his consciousness, would class themselves in the
common chemistry of thought & obey the laws of the
cheapest mental combinations. (Journals 8 70-71)
The miracle of poetry, then, is movement — “transit” — from the whole
(“the Vast”) “to the particular” and back again in a constantly evolving
spiral. This movement, Emerson states, is the universal name “God”. It is
movement that is truth; it is movement that is beauty: the ceaseless
movement of the whole in each of its particulars. And each particular, when
seen aright, takes you through the forest to the great central ever shifting
“sea” that is the whole. It is the poet who creates these forest tracks, and
therein lies his virtue. For, as Emerson makes clear the poet has no new
tools in his consciousness, no new words, beyond those of the standard
“chemistry” set owned by all. Poetry, Emerson contends, is the novel
arrangement of standard particulars available to all — that is, everyday
words — to take advantage of their shifting grounds. Even the neologisms
of Milton or Shakespeare are but new compounds on these terms. 
It is the poet’s use of these words, these endless particulars, to
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disclose the whole that turns the “cheapest mental combination” into
poetry, and makes the poet as such one with God, that is, a creator. If we
go back to 1837 Emerson writes in his journal: “To create, to create is the
proof of a Divine presence. Whoever creates is God, and whatever talents
are, if the man create not, the pure efflux of the Deity is not his” (Journals
5 341). Creation, for Emerson, is all one process: the working through of
divinity. To be a creator — a writer, an artist — is to participate in that
process. Conversely, if a man does not create then God is absent and
originality will not come. But where there is God there is original creation:
“You shall not predict what the poet shall say and whilst ephemeral poetry
hath its form, its contents, & almost its phrase out of the books & is only
skilful in paraphrase or permutation of good authors, in these the good
human soul speaks because it has something new to say” (341-342).
Creation is not merely the incremental recasting of others’ words; it is the
novel use of these words — that “common chemistry of thought” — 
as living metaphors to open new grounds. It is having something new to
say and thus participating in creation itself. To create, for Emerson, is
always to become one with the divine; and it is only by becoming a conduit
for the divine that the poet becomes original. The poet “has conspired with
the high Cause and felt the holy glee with which man detects the ultimate
oneness of the Seer & the spectacle. All the debts such a man could accu -
mulate to other wit could never disturb his consciousness or originality”
(Journals 8 70). Emerson uses the apt metaphor “conspire” — to breathe
with (recalling his earlier association of spirit with wind) — to figure the
poet’s relationship with the divine. The poet and God (“the high Cause”)
are simultaneously inspired with the breath of creation; the word of the
poet is its exhalation. It is this extraordinarily elevated sense of the poet’s
worth that will be fully explored in Emerson’s great 1844 essay “The Poet”.
Early on in “The Poet” Emerson restates the importance of the
variation of meaning to be drawn from everyday objects: “the highest
minds of the world have never ceased to explore the double meaning, or
shall I say, the quadruple, or the centuple, or much more manifold meaning,
of every sensuous fact” (Works 3 3-4). This is clearly a development of his
earlier thoughts about metaphor’s metamorphic power now straining to
express itself as what he will call “symbolism”: the liberating effect of the
endlessly shifting grounds of metaphorical ascription. The “sensuous fact”
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is the particular of nature that can be applied to affirm the whole. Access
to this “manifold meaning” is necessarily dual: the poet has to discover 
it and the reader to grasp it. This is why, as he will say so famously in “The
American Scholar” in 1837, that there is “creative reading, as well as
creative writing” (Works 1 58); a statement originally made about a year
earlier in his journal with explicit reference to his ongoing lectures. It is
the act of criticism itself, “When”, as he puts it in the journal, “the mind
is braced by the weighty expectation of a prepared work, the page of
whatever book we read, becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every
sentence is doubly significant & and the sense of our author is as broad as
the world. There is creative reading as well as creative writing” (Journals 5
233). Creative reading, then, is the acceptance of manifold meaning; the
expectation that we will be stretched, even transformed, by the potential
range of each word we read. Creative reading takes us, as readers, to the
poet’s source. 
This source for the poet, Emerson contends, is nothing more than
“the conversation they have had with nature” (Works 3 4); by which he
means the transformation of nature through the application of original
symbols; which will, in turn, transform language, the world, and every
reader. Now, once again, for most men there is an “obstruction, or some
excess of phlegm in [their] constitution” (4) which prevents them from
adequately flexing language; rather they remain in thrall to its narrow
round. The poet, though, is “the man without impediment, who sees and
handles that which others dream of, traverses the whole scale of experience,
and is representative of man, in virtue of being the largest power to receive
and to impart” (5). On initial inspection, this line seems to offer us two
directions. Firstly, it suggests that the poet is a unique being, capable of
accessing a linguistic flexibility that others can only dream of. Secondly, it
tells us that the poet is more broadly representative of man; only having a
greater degree of what all men possess: namely, the power of metaphorical
inscription. The danger here is that, in taking the first line, Emerson
elevates the poet above others; implying a kind of egotistical sublime. But
actually, and necessarily, the contrary is true for Emerson: the poet is
without impediment precisely because he disappears in his poetry. The
only impediment is the very egotism that Emerson is often accused of
valorising. Ego, or indeed individuality of any kind in the poet, is anathema
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to Emerson. Even Milton, who does so much, especially through the
idealization of Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost, to reclaim the perfectibility
of the human, and “[f ]rom a just knowledge of what man should be (… )
described what he was” (Lectures 1 160), fails to successfully remove
himself from his work. As such, Emerson complains, “Adam and Milton
are often difficult to be separated” (161). Whereas, “[i]t is true of Homer
and Shakespeare, that they do not appear in their poems; that those
prodigious geniuses did cast themselves so totally in to their song, that their
individuality vanishes, and the poet towers to the sky, whilst the man quite
disappears” (161). What is sublime is not the man but the poet; the poet
who is but the sum of his poems, not more: the man quite “disappears”,
the poet “towers to the sky”. The ideal poet, Shakespeare or Homer, has
become transparent before the flux of creation; and thus become part of
that flux; and the only way to become that is through the transformation
of language itself. In so doing the poet also represents the lapsed potential
of all people to receive and impart ever becoming nature, and thus become
creative “divinity transmuted” (Works 3 4).
For Emerson there is no ego — no individuality — in the poet
because “poetry was written before all time was, and whenever we are so
finely organised that we can penetrate into that region where the air is
music, we hear those primal warblings and attempt to write them down,
but we lose ever and anon a word, or a verse, and substitute something of
our own, and thus miswrite the poem” (5-6). As such, the poet is only
present as an individual when he or she makes a mistake, mishears, mis-
transcribes what was prior, or adds something extra — such as the cant of
Puritanism that marks, so Emerson claims, even Milton’s greatest works.
Creation on these is certainly not the act of an individual; rather it is a
particular state or “organisation” that transcends the individual but which
allows for the transcription of a prior creation as accurately as possible. The
poet disappearing into the web of nature, and then coming back to report
on nature in nature’s own form — namely, proliferating metaphor is,
arguably, the origin of Emerson’s organicism. From this we get Emerson’s
most famous statement on poetic form:
For it is not metres, but a metre-making argument, that makes
a poem, — a thought so alive, that, like the spirit of a plant
or an animal, it has an architecture of its own, and adorns
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nature with a new thing. The thought and the form are equal
in order of time, but in the order of genesis the thought is
prior to the form. The poet has a new thought: he has a whole
new experience to unfold; he will tell us how it was with him,
and all men will be the richer in his fortune. (6-7)
The first line is often offered as a defence avant la lettre of Whitman based
on the rather unlikely assumption that Emerson is suggesting metre is
passé, when he seems to me to be saying, on the contrary, that metre-
making is inevitable; a part of the very structure of nature that the poet is
reporting on. Indeed, “[a] rhyme in one of our sonnets”, he writes, “should
not be less pleasing than the iterated nodes of a sea-shell” (15). The form
of poetry when it is novel (a “new thing”) necessarily reflects the living
structure of nature. Even so the origin of that thought is troublesome to
pin down as Emerson’s circularity is, to say the least, challenging: “thought
and form are equal in order of time, but in the order of genesis the thought
is prior to the form”. The thought, one might say, is the underlying form
that comes to the poet when he disappears into nature’s flux; the alignment
of his finer organisation, ready to be written down. Earlier Emerson called
this “conspiring” with the divine; that is, breathing the same source. This
divinely inspired thought, then, is the form of the poem that will be
produced. It is a wholly new creation which is itself an open process of
“meaning in multitude”. Thus the thought precedes the form in the “order
of genesis”, that is, in the order of creation. Creation, in the romantic
tradition of Wordsworth’s “emotion recollected in tranquillity” (42) or
Shelley’s “fading coal” (228), registers the loss of a more primal experience,
which in Emerson’s case is an insight into the flowing form of nature as
proliferating language. But, and crucially I think, this later form, namely
the poem, replicates nature’s fluxions rather than petrifying a prior
moment, enabling the reader to be “richer” in the poet’s “fortune”. The
very structure of Emersonian symbolism resists stabilization and creates a
form for manifold meaning.
Symbolism, then, is the name Emerson gives to language at its highest
intensity wherein the meaning of each word is revivified and accordingly
the possibilities of man and nature are increased. But necessarily in “The
Poet” this creation of novelty does not require anything new to happen:
EMERSON’S “APPOSITE METAPHORS” AND THE GROUNDS OF CREATIVITY 117
The poorest experience is rich enough for all the purposes of
expressing thought. Why covet a knowledge of new facts? Day
and night, house and garden, a few actions, serve us as well as
would all the trades and spectacles. We are far from having
exhausted the significance of the few symbols we use. We can
come to use them yet with a terrible simplicity. (Works 3 11)
The poet, as has been already observed, does not need new words, or even
new experiences. What he needs is to recognise the proper value of language
as it is; this value lies in the innate ambiguity of all metaphorical grounds
that allow even the most mundane word (vehicle) to stand for a deeper
spiritual fact (tenor). As such a thing can represent a thought; indeed, only
a thing can represent a thought, as at root all language is metaphorical —
the aforementioned “fossil poetry”. The poet is only the place where this
ambiguity reaches its symbolic potential:
The world thus put under the mind for verb and noun, the
poet is he who can articulate it. For, though life is great, and
fascinates, and absorbs, — and though all men are intelligent
of the symbols through which it is named, — yet they cannot
originally use them. We are symbols, and inhabit symbols;
workmen, work, and tools, words and things, birth and death,
all are emblems; but we sympathize with the symbols, and,
being infatuated with the economical use of things, we do not
know that they are thoughts. (12)
Here, again, custom disables creativity. All the building blocks are there
waiting to be used, but the very economy Americans cherish — calling a
spade a spade — leaves them inarticulate. Articulacy comes when a spade
is no longer a spade, but the symbol of, say, an enquiry into hidden depths,
or of the planting of a new thought in the Earth itself. The physical,
sensual, factual world yields the symbols of spiritual expression. But the
poet does not hereby become an individual worthy in themselves of
celebration, they are but a conduit: “the condition of true naming, on the
poet’s part, is his resigning himself to the divine aura which breathes
through forms, and accompanying that” (15). The poet disappears into
pure form, pure creation.
So, far from being an obstruction to our knowledge of inner life,
inner life on these terms is the endlessly circulating grounds of the apposite
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metaphors we use to describe it; and any poetic description will necessarily
re-inscribe that inner life as something else than it was before. That is the
purpose of poetry. It is also the ground of a National Literature. In “The
Poet” Emerson laments that “[w]e do not, with sufficient plainness, of
sufficient profoundness, address ourselves to life, not dare we chaunt our
own times and social circumstances” (21). The plainness he desires is the
application of an everyday vocabulary; the profoundness is the unreleased
potential of metaphor. Emerson’s aspiration is clear: “America”, he writes,
“is a poem in our eyes, and it will not wait long for metres” (22). The
landscape, then, is already a poem, already a construction of language; 
the words used to describe it already anticipate being shaped into a form
that can adequately represent its originality; that is, they are awaiting the
opening of their ground. When these metaphors become, as they do, 
a pond, a whale, a scarlet letter, a leaf of grass, a volcano, then a national
literature is born. One purpose of Emerson’s lectures and essays is to ready
the reader for such permanent creation and enable this literature to be
recognised when it comes. But they are also a call to potential poets to
release language through metaphor, the creative flux that Emerson names
as Nature, God, the Cause, Truth, and Beauty. But these words, for all their
customary finality, never name a single thing, a discoverable entity; they
name an endless process of proliferating meanings and the endless
interpretations that will arise from them.
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This article offers an original interpretation of Emerson’s theory of metaphor as
it appears in his lectures and journals of the 1820s and 1830s, in the essay Nature
(1836), and as it develops into his theory of symbolism in the essay “The Poet”
(1844). I argue that Emerson recognizes metaphor as a liberating principle for
original expression, and I use I. A. Richards’ concept of “ground” from his 1936
theory of metaphor to explore in detail Emerson’s purposive engagement with
figurative language. What this leads to is a fresh interpretation of Emerson’s
concept of “symbolism” that is outlined in his 1844 essay “The Poet”, one of the
grounding statements of American literary originality.
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Resumo
Este artigo oferece uma interpretação original da teoria de Emerson acerca da
metáfora, tal como esta surge nas suas palestras e diários das décadas de 1820 e
1830, no ensaio Nature (1836), e como a mesma evoluiu para a sua teoria sobre
simbolismo no ensaio “The Poet” (1844). Argumento que Emerson entende a
metáfora como princípio libertador de uma expressão original, fazendo uso do
conceito de ground proposto por I. A. Richards, revelado na sua teoria sobre
metáfora de 1936, de modo a explorar em detalhe a ligação intencional (purposive
engagement) que Emerson estabelece com a linguagem figurativa. Daqui resulta
uma nova interpretação do conceito de “simbolismo” defendido por Emerson e
descrito no acima referido ensaio “The Poet”, afirmação basilar da originalidade
literária americana. 
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